The Federalist Papers (originally known as The Federalist) is a collection of 85 articles and essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay under the pseudonym "Publius" to promote the ratification of the United States Constitution.
The first 77 of these essays were published serially in the Independent Journal, the New York Packet, and The Daily Advertiser between October 1787 and April 1788. A two-volume compilation of these 77 essays and eight others was published as The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, as Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787 by publishing firm J. & A. McLean in March and May 1788.
The Federalist Papers online at Yale Law School.
The Anti-Federalist Papers are essays written by individuals raising objections to the proposed Constitution. Unlike the Federalist Papers that were composed under cooperation between Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, anti-federalists wrote independently of one another, often under pseudonyms. Major suspected authors include Cato (likely George Clinton), Brutus (likely Melancton Smith or Robert Yates or perhaps John Williams), Centinel (Samuel Bryan), and the Federal Farmer (either Melancton Smith, Richard Henry Lee, or Mercy Otis Warren). Works by Patrick Henry and a variety of others are often included as well.
Separation of Powers
The arguments are found in Federalist Papers No. 47 - 51
Wikipedia articles on No. 47, No. 48, No. 49, no. 51
In Federalist Papers, No. 47 James Madison attempted to address the anti-federalist fear that the separation of powers among the executive, judiciary, and legislature would not be defined enough in the constitution. Some had read Montesquieu as saying that all three branches of government had to be completely independent of one another (in the U.S. Constitution they are not). Madison acknowledged that the topic of separation of powers was "one of the principal objections by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution" and that "no political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value." Madison acknowledged that "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."
The Federalist Papers online at Yale Law School.
The Anti-Federalist Papers are essays written by individuals raising objections to the proposed Constitution. Unlike the Federalist Papers that were composed under cooperation between Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, anti-federalists wrote independently of one another, often under pseudonyms. Major suspected authors include Cato (likely George Clinton), Brutus (likely Melancton Smith or Robert Yates or perhaps John Williams), Centinel (Samuel Bryan), and the Federal Farmer (either Melancton Smith, Richard Henry Lee, or Mercy Otis Warren). Works by Patrick Henry and a variety of others are often included as well.
Separation of Powers
The arguments are found in Federalist Papers No. 47 - 51
Wikipedia articles on No. 47, No. 48, No. 49, no. 51
In Federalist Papers, No. 47 James Madison attempted to address the anti-federalist fear that the separation of powers among the executive, judiciary, and legislature would not be defined enough in the constitution. Some had read Montesquieu as saying that all three branches of government had to be completely independent of one another (in the U.S. Constitution they are not). Madison acknowledged that the topic of separation of powers was "one of the principal objections by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution" and that "no political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value." Madison acknowledged that "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."
Madison states Montesquieu's usage of the British government as the example of separation of powers in order to analyze Montesquieu's connections between the two. Madison quotes Montesquieu in Spirit of Laws as saying the British are the "mirror of political liberty". Thus, Montesquieu believed that the British form of separation of powers was of the utmost caliber.
Madison continues by showing that the branches of the British government are not completely separate and distinct. He explains how the monarch (executive branch) can not pass a law solely, but has the power of veto, can create foreign sovereigns, and that he/she cannot administer a justice, but appoints those who do.
He continues by examining how judges can exercise no executive or legislative action, but may be advised by the legislative counsel. Furthermore, he expresses how the legislature can do no judiciary act, but can remove judges upon agreement from both houses, can do no executive actions, but constitutes the magistracy and has the power of impeachment. From this analysis, Madison shows how each branch is, in some way, interconnected with one another. Madison also infers that when Montesquieu wrote, "There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates… if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers." He did not mean that there was to be no "partial agency." The idea that each branch would stand alone to solely deal with its own responsibilities is one that Madison believes is impractical and non-beneficial. "Diversifying the voices heard in government not only helps to prevent one point of view from becoming too strong, but also promotes the affirmative goal of democratizing governmental decision-making."
Madison takes a different angle at separations of powers at this point in the paper and considers them as more a system of "checks and balances" as he begins to address the states' constitutions that had been created since the Revolution began. Madison writes that there was "Not a single instance in which the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct" when he examined each constitution and showed none of them had a complete separation of government branches.
Madison made a few exceptions when going over each state in No. 47. Massachusetts's constitution was in agreement with Montesquieu on the separation of powers as it did not state a clear disconnect between the three branches, but did contain partial agencies. New York's had no declaration on the subject even though they did not have total separation either. For New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, they all had constitutions that were contradicting in regards to separation of powers. Each state had a similar thesis on the topic, such as New Hampshire's when it states "Powers ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each other as the nature of a free government will admit." However, each state's legislature appointed its executive, and each state's legislature had impeachment authority and appointed the judiciary members, except for Maryland's in which the executive appointed the judiciary. What more than anything else makes the use of Montesquieu's maxim in 1776 perplexing is the great discrepancy between the affirmations of the need to separate the several government departments and the actual political practice the state governments followed. Madison believes that the fundamental principle of their constitutions have been violated, and wishes not to be seen as disapproving the states' governments, but by bringing light upon the inconsistency that was taking place, and the unjustified scrutiny upon the new constitution.
Checks and Balances
"But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?... In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."
Madison continues by showing that the branches of the British government are not completely separate and distinct. He explains how the monarch (executive branch) can not pass a law solely, but has the power of veto, can create foreign sovereigns, and that he/she cannot administer a justice, but appoints those who do.
He continues by examining how judges can exercise no executive or legislative action, but may be advised by the legislative counsel. Furthermore, he expresses how the legislature can do no judiciary act, but can remove judges upon agreement from both houses, can do no executive actions, but constitutes the magistracy and has the power of impeachment. From this analysis, Madison shows how each branch is, in some way, interconnected with one another. Madison also infers that when Montesquieu wrote, "There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates… if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers." He did not mean that there was to be no "partial agency." The idea that each branch would stand alone to solely deal with its own responsibilities is one that Madison believes is impractical and non-beneficial. "Diversifying the voices heard in government not only helps to prevent one point of view from becoming too strong, but also promotes the affirmative goal of democratizing governmental decision-making."
Madison takes a different angle at separations of powers at this point in the paper and considers them as more a system of "checks and balances" as he begins to address the states' constitutions that had been created since the Revolution began. Madison writes that there was "Not a single instance in which the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct" when he examined each constitution and showed none of them had a complete separation of government branches.
Madison made a few exceptions when going over each state in No. 47. Massachusetts's constitution was in agreement with Montesquieu on the separation of powers as it did not state a clear disconnect between the three branches, but did contain partial agencies. New York's had no declaration on the subject even though they did not have total separation either. For New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, they all had constitutions that were contradicting in regards to separation of powers. Each state had a similar thesis on the topic, such as New Hampshire's when it states "Powers ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each other as the nature of a free government will admit." However, each state's legislature appointed its executive, and each state's legislature had impeachment authority and appointed the judiciary members, except for Maryland's in which the executive appointed the judiciary. What more than anything else makes the use of Montesquieu's maxim in 1776 perplexing is the great discrepancy between the affirmations of the need to separate the several government departments and the actual political practice the state governments followed. Madison believes that the fundamental principle of their constitutions have been violated, and wishes not to be seen as disapproving the states' governments, but by bringing light upon the inconsistency that was taking place, and the unjustified scrutiny upon the new constitution.
Checks and Balances
"But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?... In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."
"A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State."
- James Madison, The Federalist Papers No. 51
Republican Virtue (Wikipedia article)
"Public Virtue cannot exist without private, and public Virtue is the only Foundation of Republics. There must be a positive Passion for the public good, the public Interest, Honor, Power, and Glory, established in the Minds of the People, or there can be no Republican Government, nor any real Liberty. And this public Passion must be Superior to all private Passions. Men must be ready, they must pride themselves, and be happy to sacrifice their private Pleasures, Passions, and Interests, nay their private Friendships and dearest connections, when they Stand in Competition with the Rights of society."
- John Adams, 1776
"THE THIRD charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be taken from that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few.... The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust. The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government. The means relied on in this form of government for preventing their degeneracy are numerous and various. The most effectual one, is such a limitation of the term of appointments as will maintain a proper responsibility to the people."
- Federalist Paper No. 57
"Federalist No. 10" is generally regarded as the most important of the 85 articles from a philosophical perspective. In it, Madison discusses the means of preventing rule by majority faction and advocates a large, commercial republic. This is complemented by "Federalist No. 14", in which Madison takes the measure of the United States, declares it appropriate for an extended republic, and concludes with a memorable defense of the constitutional and political creativity of the Federal Convention.
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