Montesquieu - Spirit of the Law - Miscellaneous

Aristocracies

In an aristocracy, one part of the people governs the rest.  The principle of an aristocratic government is moderation, the virtue which leads those who govern in an aristocracy to restrain themselves both from oppressing the people and from trying to acquire excessive power over one another.  In an aristocracy, the laws should be designed to instill and protect this spirit of moderation.  To do so, they must do three things...

1)  First, the laws must prevent the nobility from abusing the people.  The power of the nobility makes such abuse a standing temptation in an aristocracy; to avoid it, the laws should deny the nobility some powers, like the power to tax, which would make this temptation all but irresistible, and should try to foster responsible and moderate administration.

2.  Second, the laws should disguise as much as possible the difference between the nobility and the people, so that the people feel their lack of power as little as possible.  Thus the nobility should have modest and simple manners, since if they do not attempt to distinguish themselves from the people "the people are apt to forget their subjection and weakness." 

3. Finally, the laws should try to ensure equality among the nobles themselves, and among noble families. When they fail to do so, the nobility will lose its spirit of moderation, and the government will be corrupted.



Monarchies

In a monarchy, one person governs "by fixed and established laws."  These laws "necessarily suppose the intermediate channels through which (the monarch's) power flows: for if there be only the momentary and capricious will of a single person to govern the state, nothing can be fixed, and, of course, there is no fundamental law."  These 'intermediate channels' are such subordinate institutions as the nobility and an independent judiciary; and the laws of a monarchy should therefore be designed to preserve their power.  The principle of monarchical government is honor.  Unlike the virtue required by republican governments, the desire to win honor and distinction comes naturally.  For this reason education has a less difficult task in a monarchy than in a republic: it need only heighten our ambitions and our sense of our own worth, provide us with an ideal of honor worth aspiring to, and cultivate in us the politeness needed to live with others whose sense of their worth matches our own.  The chief task of the laws in a monarchy is to protect the subordinate institutions that distinguish monarchy from despotism.  To this end, they should make it easy to preserve large estates undivided, protect the rights and privileges of the nobility, and promote the rule of law.  They should also encourage the proliferation of distinctions and of rewards for honorable conduct, including luxuries.



Corruption and despotism

A monarchy is corrupted when the monarch either destroys the subordinate institutions that constrain his will, or decides to rule arbitrarily, without regard to the basic laws of his country, or debases the honors at which his citizens might aim, so that "men are capable of being loaded at the very same time with infamy and with dignities."  The first two forms of corruption destroy the checks on the sovereign's will that separate monarchy from despotism; the third severs the connection between honorable conduct and its proper rewards.  In a functioning monarchy, personal ambition and a sense of honor work together.  This is monarchy's great strength and the source of its extraordinary stability: whether its citizens act from genuine virtue, a sense of their own worth, a desire to serve their king, or personal ambition, they will be led to act in ways that serve their country.  A monarch who rules arbitrarily, or who rewards servility and ignoble conduct instead of genuine honor, severs this connection and corrupts his government.

In despotic states "a single person directs everything by his own will and caprice."  Without laws to check him, and with no need to attend to anyone who does not agree with him, a despot can do whatever he likes, however ill-advised or reprehensible.  His subjects are no better than slaves, and he can dispose of them as he sees fit.  The principle of despotism is fear.  This fear is easily maintained, since the situation of a despot's subjects is genuinely terrifying.  Education is unnecessary in a despotism; if it exists at all, it should be designed to debase the mind and break the spirit.  Such ideas as honor and virtue should not occur to a despot's subjects, since "persons capable of setting a value on themselves would be likely to create disturbances.  Fear must therefore depress their spirits, and extinguish even the least sense of ambition."  Their "portion here, like that of beasts, is instinct, compliance, and punishment," and any higher aspirations should be brutally discouraged.

Montesquieu writes that "the principle of despotic government is subject to a continual corruption, because it is even in its nature corrupt."  Despotic governments undermine themselves.  Because property is not secure in a despotic state, commerce will not flourish, and the state will be poor.  The people must be kept in a state of fear by the threat of punishment; however, over time the punishments needed to keep them in line will tend to become more and more severe, until further threats lose their force.  Most importantly, however, the despot's character is likely to prevent him from ruling effectively.  Since a despot's every whim is granted, he "has no occasion to deliberate, to doubt, to reason; he has only to will."  For this reason he is never forced to develop anything like intelligence, character, or resolution.  Instead, he is "naturally lazy, voluptuous, and ignorant." and has no interest in actually governing his people.

Monarchical and republican governments involve specific governmental structures, and require that their citizens have specific sorts of motivation.  When these structures crumble, or these motivations fail, monarchical and republican governments are corrupted, and the result of their corruption is that they fall into despotism.  But when a particular despotic government falls, it is not generally replaced by a monarchy or a republic.  The creation of a stable monarchy or republic is extremely difficult: "a masterpiece of legislation, rarely produced by hazard, and seldom attained by prudence."  It is particularly difficult when those who would have both to frame the laws of such a government and to live by them have previously been brutalized and degraded by despotism.  Producing a despotic government, by contrast, is relatively straightforward.  A despotism requires no powers to be carefully balanced against one another, no institutions to be created and maintained in existence, no complicated motivations to be fostered, and no restraints on power to be kept in place.  One need only terrify one's fellow citizens enough to allow one to impose one's will on them; and this, Montesquieu claims, "is what every capacity may reach."  For these reasons despotism necessarily stands in a different relation to corruption than other forms of government: while they are liable to corruption, despotism is its embodiment.


3.  Climate and Geography 

Montesquieu believes that climate and geography affect the temperaments and customs of a country's inhabitants. He is not a determinist, and does not believe that these influences are irresistible.  Nonetheless, he believes that the laws should take these effects into account, accommodating them when necessary, and counteracting their worst effects. 

According to Montesquieu, a cold climate constricts our bodies' fibers, and causes coarser juices to flow through them.  Heat, by contrast, expands our fibers, and produces more rarefied juices.  These physiological changes affect our characters.  Those who live in cold climates are vigorous and bold, phlegmatic, frank, and not given to suspicion or cunning.  They are relatively insensitive to pleasure and pain; Montesquieu writes that "you must flay a Muscovite alive to make him feel."  Those who live in warm climates have stronger but less durable sensations.  They are more fearful, more amorous, and more susceptible both to the temptations of pleasure and to real or imagined pain; but they are less resolute, and less capable of sustained or decisive action.  The manners of those who live in temperate climates are "inconstant", since "the climate has not a quality determinate enough to fix them."  These differences are not hereditary: if one moves from one sort of climate to another, one's temperament will alter accordingly.

A hot climate can make slavery comprehensible. Montesquieu writes that "the state of slavery is in its own nature bad." he is particularly contemptuous of religious and racist justifications for slavery.  However, on his view, there are two types of country in which slavery, while not acceptable, is less bad than it might otherwise be.  In despotic countries, the situation of slaves is not that different from the situation of the despot's other subjects; for this reason, slavery in a despotic state is "more tolerable" than in other countries.  In unusually hot countries, it might be that "the excess of heat enervates the body, and renders men so slothful and dispirited that nothing but the fear of chastisement can oblige them to perform any laborious duty: slavery is there more reconcilable to reason."  However, Montesquieu writes that when work can be done by freemen motivated by the hope of gain rather than by slaves motivated by fear, the former will always work better; and that in such climates slavery is not only wrong but imprudent.  He hopes that "there is not that climate upon earth where the most laborious services might not with proper encouragement be performed by freemen."  If there is no such climate, then slavery could never be justified on these grounds.

The quality of a country's soil also affects the form of its government.  Monarchies are more common where the soil is fertile, and republics where it is barren.  This is so for three reasons.  First, those who live in fruitful countries are more apt to be content with their situation, and to value in a government not the liberty it bestows but its ability to provide them with enough security that they can get on with their farming.  They are therefore more willing to accept a monarchy if it can provide such security.  Often it can, since monarchies can respond to threats more quickly than republics.  Second, fertile countries are both more desirable than barren countries and easier to conquer: they "are always of a level surface, where the inhabitants are unable to dispute against a stronger power; they are then obliged to submit; and when they have once submitted, the spirit of liberty cannot return; the wealth of the country is a pledge of their fidelity."  Montesquieu believes that monarchies are much more likely than republics to wage wars of conquest, and therefore that a conquering power is likely to be a monarchy.  Third, those who live where the soil is barren have to work hard in order to survive; this tends to make them "industrious, sober, inured to hardship, courageous, and fit for war."  Those who inhabit fertile country, by contrast, favor "ease, effeminacy, and a certain fondness for the preservation of life."  For this reason, the inhabitants of barren countries are better able to defend themselves from such attacks as might occur, and to defend their liberty against those who would destroy it.

These facts give barren countries advantages that compensate for the infertility of their soil.  Since they are less likely to be invaded, they are less likely to be sacked and devastated; and they are more likely to be worked well, since "countries are not cultivated in proportion to their fertility, but to their liberty."  This is why "the best provinces are most frequently depopulated, while the frightful countries of the North continue always inhabited, from their being almost uninhabitable." 

Montesquieu believes that the climate and geography of Asia explain why despotism flourishes there.  Asia, he thinks, has two features that distinguish it from Europe.  First, Asia has virtually no temperate zone.  While the mountains of Scandinavia shelter Europe from arctic winds, Asia has no such buffer; for this reason its frigid northern zone extends much further south than in Europe, and there is a relatively quick transition from it to the tropical south.  For this reason "the warlike, brave, and active people touch immediately upon those who are indolent, effeminate and timorous; the one must, therefore, conquer, and the other be conquered."  In Europe, by contrast, the climate changes gradually from cold to hot; therefore "strong nations are opposed to the strong; and those who join each other have nearly the same courage."  Second, Asia has larger plains than Europe.  Its mountain ranges lie further apart, and its rivers are not such formidable barriers to invasion.  Since Europe is naturally divided into smaller regions, it is more difficult for any one power to conquer them all; this means that Europe will tend to have more and smaller states.  Asia, by contrast, tends to have much larger empires, which predisposes it to despotism.




4.  Commerce 

Commerce does not require vast armies, or the continued subjugation of other peoples.  It does not undermine itself, as the extraction of gold from colonial mines does, and it rewards domestic industry.  It therefore sustains itself, and nations which engage in it, over time.  While it does not produce all the virtues -- hospitality, Montesquieu thinks, is more often found among the poor than among commercial peoples -- it does produce some: "the spirit of commerce is naturally attended with that of frugality, economy, moderation, labor, prudence, tranquility, order, and rule."  In addition, it "is a cure for the most destructive prejudices," improves manners, and leads to peace among nations.

Of all the ways in which a country might seek to enrich itself, Montesquieu believes, commerce is the only one without overwhelming drawbacks.  Conquering and plundering one's neighbors can provide temporary infusions of money, but over time the costs of maintaining an occupying army and administering subjugated peoples impose strains that few countries can endure.  Extracting precious metals from colonial mines leads to general inflation; thus the costs of extraction increase while the value of the extracted metals decreases.  The increased availability of money furthers the development of commerce in other countries; however, in the country which extracts gold and silver, domestic industry is destroyed.

In monarchies, Montesquieu believes, the aim of commerce is, for the most part, to supply luxuries. In republics, it is to bring from one country what is wanted in another, "gaining little" but "gaining incessantly."  In despotisms, there is very little commerce of any kind, since there is no security of property.  In a monarchy, neither kings nor nobles should engage in commerce, since this would risk concentrating too much power in their hands.  By the same token, there should be no banks in a monarchy, since a treasure "no sooner becomes great than it becomes the treasure of the prince."  In republics, by contrast, banks are extremely useful, and anyone should be allowed to engage in trade.  Restrictions on which profession a person can follow destroy people's hopes of bettering their situation; they are therefore appropriate only to despotic states.

While some mercantilists had argued that commerce is a zero-sum game in which when some gain, others necessarily lose, Montesquieu believes that commerce benefits all countries except those who have nothing but their land and what it produces.  In those deeply impoverished countries, commerce with other countries will encourage those who own the land to oppress those who work it, rather than encouraging the development of domestic industries and manufacture.  However, all other countries benefit by commerce, and should seek to trade with as many other nations as possible, "for it is competition which sets a just value on merchandise, and establishes the relation between them." 

Montesquieu describes commerce as an activity that cannot be confined or controlled by any individual government or monarch.  This, in his view, has always been true: "Commerce is sometimes destroyed by conquerors, sometimes cramped by monarchs; it traverses the earth, flies from the places where it is oppressed, and stays where it has liberty to breathe."  However, the independence of commerce was greatly enhanced when, during the medieval period, Jews responded to persecution and the seizure of their property by inventing letters of exchange.  "Commerce, by this method, became capable of eluding violence, and of maintaining everywhere its ground; the richest merchant having none but invisible effects, which he could convey imperceptibly wherever he pleased."  This set in motion developments which made commerce still more independent of monarchs and their whims.

First, it facilitated the development of international markets, which place prices outside the control of governments.  Money, according to Montesquieu, is "a sign which represents the value of all merchandise."  The price of merchandise depends on the quantity of money and the quantity of merchandise, and on the amounts of money and merchandise that are in trade.  Monarchs can affect this price by imposing tariffs or duties on certain goods.  But since they cannot control the amounts of money and merchandise that are in trade within their own countries, let alone internationally, a monarch "can no more fix the price of merchandise than he can establish by a decree that the relation 1 has to 10 is equal to that of 1 to 20."  If a monarch attempts to do so, he courts disaster: "Julian's lowering the price of provisions at Antioch was the cause of a most terrible famine." 

Second, it permitted the development of international currency exchanges, which place the exchange rate of a country's currency largely outside the control of that country's government.  A monarch can establish a currency, and stipulate how much of some metal each unit of that currency shall contain.  However, monarchs cannot control the rates of exchange between their currencies and those of other countries.  These rates depend on the relative scarcity of money in the countries in question, and they are "fixed by the general opinion of the merchants, never by the decrees of the prince."  For this reason "the exchange of all places constantly tends to a certain proportion, and that in the very nature of things." 

Finally, the development of international commerce gives governments a great incentive to adopt policies that favor, or at least do not impede, its development.  Governments need to maintain confidence in their creditworthiness if they wish to borrow money; this deters them from at least the more extreme forms of fiscal irresponsibility, and from oppressing too greatly those citizens from whom they might later need to borrow money.  Since the development of commerce requires the availability of loans, governments must establish interest rates high enough to encourage lending, but not so high as to make borrowing unprofitable.  Taxes must not be so high that they deprive citizens of the hope of bettering their situations, and the laws should allow those citizens enough freedom to carry out commercial affairs.

In general, Montesquieu believes that commerce has had an extremely beneficial influence on government.  Since commerce began to recover after the development of letters of exchange and the reintroduction of lending at interest, he writes:

"it became necessary that princes should govern with more prudence than they themselves could ever have imagined; for great exertions of authority were, in the event, found to be impolitic ... We begin to be cured of Machiavelism, and recover from it every day. More moderation has become necessary in the councils of princes. What would formerly have been called a master-stroke in politics would be now, independent of the horror it might occasion, the greatest imprudence. Happy is it for men that they are in a situation in which, though their passions prompt them to be wicked, it is, nevertheless, to their interest to be humane and virtuous."  (SL 21.20)