Francis Hutcheson  (1694—1745)  Scottish



Hutcheson in Wikipedia, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy


Writings:

1725  -  Inquiry concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony and Design
1725  -  Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil
1728  -  Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections
1728  -  Illustrations upon the Moral Sense


Hutcheson was the first important philosopher of the Scottish Enlightenment.  He was an Ulster-Scott born in Ulster, Ireland.  He was educated in Edinburgh, Scotland for six years before returning to Ireland and was a professor of moral philosophy at the University of Edinburgh.  His philosophy influenced further Scottish Enlightenment thinkers like David Hume and Adam Smith.  He was an early proponent of natural law based on sentiment (emotion) rather than reason.  He was also influential in the area of aesthetics.

For historians and political scientists, the emphasis has been on his theories of liberalism and political rights; for philosophers and psychologists, Hutcheson’s importance comes from his theories of human nature, which include an account of an innate care and concern for others and of the internal senses (including the moral sense).  Hutcheson promoted a natural benevolence against the egoism of Thomas Hobbes and against the reward/punishment view of Samuel Pufendorf by appealing to our own experiences of ourselves and others.

Hutcheson was one of the first critics of slavery in the 18th century. 

 
Moral Philosophy:  Moral sentimentalism
 
Hutcheson claimed that humans, beyond their five senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste and feeling,
have three other senses: a public sense, a sense of honor, and a moral sense.   

For Hutcheson, the moral sense is from God, implanted, not like innate ideas, but as an innate sense of pleasure for objects that are not necessarily to our advantage—and for nobler pleasures like caring for others or appreciation of harmony.  

We know this because we experience moral feelings of approbation and disapprobation.  We do not choose to make moral approvals or disapprovals; they just happen to us and we feel the approvals when they occur.  Hutcheson put it this way: “approbation is not what we can voluntarily bring upon ourselves.”

Reason does, however, inform the moral sense: reasoning and information can change the evaluation of the moral sense, but no amount of reasoning can or does precede the moral sense in regard to its approval of what is for the public good.    The moral sense approves of the good for others.  This concern for others by the moral sense is what is natural to humankind, Hutcheson contended. 

Hutcheson, borrowing from Aristotle, explained that reason and the intellect help determine how to reach an end or goal.  Yet the desire for that goal is the job of the will.  The will is moved by the desire for that end which, of course, for Aristotle, was happiness (it is teleological).  It is not the proposition that a certain act will produce lots of money that excites a person, but rather the instinct toward happiness and the belief that money will bring the desired happiness. 

Against Hobbes, Hutcheson says the foundation of our moral determinations is not self-love.  What is basic to morality is our inclination for benevolence.   He argues that from our own experiences we can see that there are, in fact, disinterested motivations common in humankind.  Hutcheson specifically claims that the term ‘state of nature’ as used by Hobbes and Pufendorf creates a misunderstanding of what is actually present in human nature.  The actual ‘state of nature,’ for Hutcheson, includes the benevolence he claimed as instinctual to humankind created by God.  In forming a society, people create a cultivated state to take care of themselves and want all of humankind to be safe and sound. 

Hutcheson also added that human beings naturally care what others think of them.  He described this characteristic, observed in others and experienced in ourselves, as “a natural delight men take in being esteemed and honoured by others for good actions…” These characteristics, “all may be observed to prevail exceedingly in humane life,” are ones that we witness daily in people.


Like our innate moral sense, humans also have an innate sense of beauty.  We have a visceral aesthetic reaction of attraction or repulsion to what we see and hear.  The smell of a rose seems beautiful to us, the smell of sour milk is repulsive.  
         
Like our moral sense, our reason can be used to cultivate our aesthetic sense, thus changing our reaction to a certain stimuli.  For instance, abstract art often tends to repulse us at first, but as we learn about it, we sometimes come to find it attractive / beautiful.  


Economics

     Francis Hutcheson as a precursor to Adam Smith's economics  (12 minute video)

We will pick up here on the first day of the next course.



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